

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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September 2, 1983

83-4332/1

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DONALD GREGG  
Assistant to the Vice President  
for National Security Affairs

MR. CHARLES HILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

COL JOHN STANFORD  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Defense

MR. LOGAN H. SALLADA  
Director, Executive Secretariat  
Department of Transportation

MR. ALTON KEEL  
Associate Director for National  
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Office of Management and Budget

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Central Intelligence Agency

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Executive Assistant to the Nited States  
Representative to the United Nations  
Department of State

BRIGADIER GENERAL GEORGE A. JOULWAN  
Executive Assistant to the Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MS. TERESA COLLINS  
Chief, Secretariat Staff  
U.S. Information Agency

SUBJECT: NSPG Meeting on Korean Airline Incident (C)

Attached is an options paper prepared by the State Department for  
today's NSPG meeting. (C)

*Robert M. Kimmitt*  
Robert M. Kimmitt  
Executive Secretary

Attachment

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DECLASSIFY ON: OADR



Washington, D.C. 20520


September 2, 1981

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: KAL Flight: Options Paper for Today's NSC  
Meeting

Attached is an options paper with recommendations for  
action for use at today's NSC meeting on the KAL incident.

*for*   
for Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

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**SECRET****Near-Term Actions on Civil Aviation**

At today's NSC meeting, we should consider concrete measures to register our condemnation of the Soviet attack on the Korean Air Lines aircraft and to impose a real cost on the Soviets. To maximize the cost and impose it quickly, we should concentrate on steps that can most efficiently exploit international outrage and generate multilateral solidarity. The world's attention is focussed on Soviet use of unprovoked force against peaceful air travellers.

Thus, we believe it important that our measures be concentrated in the civil aviation area and fully reflect the international outrage this incident has evoked. We need to spark international penalization of this egregious act without lending credibility to the inevitable Soviet claim that we are using the incident to freeze East-West relations even further. By sticking to the humanitarian and air safety aspects, in other words, we can avoid sacrificing the unity of outrage that presently exists. We think the following package of measures strikes the right balance.

1. We should seek immediate agreement by as many countries as possible to refuse to accept flight plans for Aeroflot for a minimum period of 30-60 days or until the Soviets have provided a satisfactory response to the international community. This would have the immediate advantage of registering a broad international condemnation of the Soviet action, but within a specific time frame so that it would be acceptable within the international community. Critical to the success of this effort will be securing the cooperation of the Canadians (since Montreal is the only remaining Aeroflot destination north of the Rio Grande), the Japanese, the Koreans, and several European countries. We would begin by diplomatic approaches to these critical countries and expand the effort, assuming we have a reasonable chance of success.

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2. We should seek to suspend non-safety related ongoing discussions between the USSR and other national civil aviation bodies with a view to interrupting such arrangements as route awards, requests for the waiver of landing fees, etc. This measure, which would be raised with other governments in connection with step one, might have considerable impact on Soviet plans to expand their civil aviation operations worldwide, but could be acceptable to many in the international community, since it would not affect current operations once the steps taken under option #1 were terminated.

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3. Boycott. The Air Line Pilots' Association (ALPA) has already communicated with Andropov, Dobrynin, and ICAO, and is considering steps to implement an international boycott aimed at halting Aeroflot service outside the USSR and international airline service to Moscow as well. In addition, airlines may wish to join this effort. Other American labor leaders as well as foreign pilots' groups may be contemplating similar steps.

We will be meeting with these groups to learn more about their intentions, which could well serve to emphasize the level of international reaction.

4. Initiate procedures to censure the USSR at a special meeting of the ICAO Council next week. The President of the ICAO Council is attempting to arrange an urgent meeting of the Council, at which we will seek an ICAO investigation of events leading to the destruction of the KAL flight. That meeting will probably occur early next week. We may wish to ask the UN Security Council to reinforce this request. Our subsequent tactics will depend on developments in both fora.

5. Strong Reaffirmation of Existing Sanction. We would make a strong public reaffirmation that our present suspension of all regularly-scheduled Aeroflot service to this country remains the policy of this Administration and we have no plans to alter it. U.S. reactions to the shootdown showed that much of the public is not aware of this sanction, which has been very keenly felt by the Soviets. There has been pressure building to lift this sanction so that the reaffirmation would further underscore our abhorrence of this particular Soviet action.

6. Claims. Under international law, the U.S. would be entitled to make a claim against the Soviet Union for the wrongful death of our citizens. Korea and other affected countries would also have this right. There is precedent for making such a claim for compensation and for demanding that they take all appropriate measures to prevent a recurrence, inform us concerning those measures and punish all persons responsible for the incident. We will prepare such a claim against the Soviets, to be conveyed through diplomatic channels, and discuss the matter with the Koreans with a view to including any claim they may wish us to present on their behalf.

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7. Cancel interline ticketing arrangements with Aeroflot.

At present, Aeroflot has arrangements to write tickets for travel on other airlines. If this and the attendant appearance of Aeroflot flights in other airline computers were cancelled, this would present the Soviets with serious impediments to selling tickets for travel into and outside the USSR. We will investigate the feasibility under U.S. domestic law of requiring our airlines to cancel these arrangements and the willingness of other countries to join us in similar steps.

We also considered a review of all outstanding U.S., Allied and third country equipment sales to the Soviet aviation industry. On balance, we think this would get in the way of achieving the more immediate steps above and might even jeopardize the safety of international aviation operations by cutting sales of necessary safety-related equipment to the USSR.

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